All posts by Arfan Khan

High Court Appeal in Zambian Adoption Case Withdrawn

Appeal, Commercial and Chancery, Commercial and International Law, Court of Appeal, , , ,

High Court Appeal in Zambian Adoption Case Withdrawn

Arfan Khan appeared for the successful Claimant at trial and the successful Respondent on appeal in a Zambian adoption dispute, instructed by CV Brooks Solicitors.

On 30 July 2025, following a 2.5-day trial, Deputy Master Jefferis entered judgment for the Claimant. The Deputy Master declined to give effect to the Zambian judgment and held that the Claimant had been lawfully adopted by the deceased. He further determined that the Defendant was not entitled to letters of administration, ordered that the Zambian grant should not be resealed in England and Wales, and awarded costs against the Defendant. Repeated requests for adjournment were refused.

The Appellant subsequently instructed counsel and filed a notice of appeal seeking permission to challenge the trial judgment on complex grounds, including alleged errors of law and fact and a proposed challenge to the fairness of the trial. The Appellant applied for a stay of execution, which was refused on the papers by Mr Justice Mellor. A renewed stay application was made, and an extension of time to file the appeal bundle was requested. The extension request was unopposed.

Following submissions by Arfan Khan on both the renewed stay application and the merits of the proposed appeal, the Appellant’s counsel elected not to pursue the stay at the oral hearing. Mr Justice Rajah dismissed the renewed stay application and ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent’s costs. The Appellant subsequently withdrew the appeal, which Mr Justice Rajah formally dismissed.

Arfan Khan has acted as lead or sole counsel in close to over 70 reported cases, including landmark decisions in the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court, demonstrating the strength of his practice in Chancery, Commercial, and Public Law.

Press coverage and the Master’s judgments can be accessed via the following links:

Note of the Trial Judgment

  • Master’s Interlocutory Decisions:

Adjournment Decision 1

Adjournment decision 2

Court of Appeal grants permission to appeal in novel appeal from the EAT: Arfan Khan appeared for the successful Appellant

Court of Appeal, Guidance from the Court of Appeal

Introduction

Arfan Khan, instructed by DCK Solicitors, obtained permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in a case from the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), involving a novel legal issue under Rule 37 (5) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 (the EAT Rules). Thereafter, the appeal settled.

The factual context

The issue arose from the EAT’s refusal to extend time to appeal where the Appellant’s solicitors had failed to file two documents — the ET3 and the grounds of resistance — when lodging the appeal. The Appellant’s solicitors lodged an appeal on 18 September 2021, but they failed to include the ET3 form and grounds of resistance. Although the solicitors inquired about the appeal’s progress, the omission was only identified by the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 23 April 2022, prompting the submission of the missing documents two days later. The EAT Registrar ruled the appeal to be 217 days late and refused an extension. This decision was upheld by an EAT judge, where the Appellant was represented by different counsel.

The appeal to the Court of Appeal

The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the EAT applied the wrong test when determining whether to grant the Appellant an extension of time to file the complete appeal notice. The Appellant contended that EAT had erred in law by misapplying Rule 37 (5), and in the exercise of its discretion, where the delay was minor and rectified without prejudice to the Respondent. At the time of filing, there was no authority directly addressing this issue in a case involving a solicitor’s error.

After the Appellant filed written submissions, the Court of Appeal handed down two decisions — Davies v BMW (UK) Manufacturing Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 356 and Melki v Bouygues [2025] EWCA Civ 585 — both of which supported the Appellant’s original analysis advanced by Arfan Khan on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Appellant made further submissions. Lady Justice Laing directed amended grounds of appeal on 20/5/2025, and these were filed on 21/5/2025. Insofar as relevant, these included the following grounds and arguments:

1.  The EAT failed to interpret Rule 37 (5) of the EAT rules correctly and consistently with legislative intent. The Appellant argued that rule 37 (5) did not require a satisfactory explanation for the error, and the common law authorities to the contrary did not have to be followed in light of higher authority concerning statutory construction. The Appellant relied on the observations of Lady Justice Laing in Melki, where the Court of Appeal questioned the imposition of a test requiring a satisfactory explanation not grounded in the statutory language in Rule 37 (5) (paragraphs [56], [58], and [59]).

2. The EAT’s refusal to extend time was, in any event, a wrongful exercise of discretion. The procedural error was inadvertent, swiftly rectified upon notification, and had not caused any material prejudice to the Respondent. The Appellant relied on the reasoning of Lord Justice Underhill in Melki at paragraph [64], who drew a clear distinction between procedural failures arising from deliberate or reckless disregard of the rules (or pursuit of a tactical advantage) and those resulting from mere inadvertence. The latter, on the reasoning of Lord Justice Underhill, may be sufficient to justify the grant of an extension of time.

The Respondent resisted the application for permission to appeal and amend the grounds through counsel. However, Lady Justice Laing granted both permission to appeal and permission to amend the grounds of appeal. In doing so, she noted the absence of authority on the application of amended Rule 37 in circumstances where, as here, the appellant was legally represented at the time the notice of appeal was filed.

 

 

 

Zambian Adoption Recognised in English High Court Probate Trial: Arfan Khan Acts for Successful Claimant

Chancery Division Trial, Conflict of Laws, , , ,

Zambian Adoption Recognised in English High Court Probate Trial: Arfan Khan Acts for Successful Claimant

Introduction

Arfan Khan appeared for the successful Claimant in a contested probate trial before Deputy Master Jefferis in the High Court, Chancery Division. The extempore Judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025, following a 2.5-day trial. The Court granted the Claimant a declaration that he was an adopted son of the deceased and, accordingly, entitled to letters of administration. The Defendant was ordered to pay the Claimant’s costs, including an interim payment on account of such costs.

This was notwithstanding the Defendant’s reliance on a judgment of the Zambian High Court, which had previously granted letters of administration over the same estate to her and another relative.

Procedural Background

The Defendant was initially legally represented, but her legal team withdrew. The Defendant then appeared in person at trial, accompanied by a McKenzie friend, authorised by the Court.

During the hearing, the Defendant made three separate applications to adjourn, one of which was supported by medical evidence that the Court found inadequate. Applying established legal principles on adjournments, the Court refused all three applications and awarded the Claimant costs in respect of each.

Factual Background

The Claimant was adopted in Zambia in November 2002 and subsequently relocated to the United Kingdom, where he lived with the deceased. He was enrolled in school and registered with a GP surgery, naming the deceased as his parent. His UK immigration records confirmed entry as her adopted child.

The Claimant’s adoption status was never disputed during the deceased’s lifetime. However, following her death, the Defendant allegedly excluded the Claimant from estate matters and removed documentation evidencing the adoption. The Defendant later obtained letters of administration in Zambia, but it emerged that the Zambian Court had not been shown key adoption documents, which were subsequently produced in the English High Court proceedings.

The Issues

The central issue for the Court was whether the Claimant had been lawfully adopted by the deceased and, if so, whether he was entitled to letters of administration in priority to the Defendant. The Defendant opposed the Claimant’s application and sought a grant in favour of the deceased’s sibling. She further alleged that the Claimant’s birth certificate was a forgery and invited the English Court to recognise the Zambian grant of administration.

During trial, the Defendant introduced—for the first time—an adoption petition suggesting that the deceased had applied to adopt another relative. She contended that this undermined the Claimant’s case and highlighted alleged inconsistencies in the Claimant’s parentage.

Expert Evidence and Submissions

Arfan Khan conducted the examination-in-chief of the Claimant’s expert in Zambian law. The expert gave evidence as to the authenticity and legal effect of the Zambian adoption documents, confirming that they were valid and binding under Zambian law.

Following the Defendant’s withdrawal from the proceedings, the Court adapted the trial process to ensure procedural fairness by undertaking the cross-examination itself that would ordinarily have been conducted by the Defendant. In response to judicial questions, the expert reaffirmed the validity and binding nature of the adoption order.

Recognition of the Zambian Grant

On behalf of the Claimant, Arfan Khan submitted that the Zambian grant of letters of administration should not be recognised in England and Wales, as it had been obtained in breach of the principles of natural justice. Specifically, the Zambian court had not been shown material adoption documents. It was further argued that the adoption documents were authentic and legally valid under Zambian law.

The Court accepted these submissions and declined to give effect to the Zambian judgment. The Judge therefore ordered that the Zambian grant should not be resealed in England and Wales.

The Court also noted a further submission advanced by Arfan Khan on behalf of the Claimant: that, based on the date of birth recorded in the documentary evidence, the individual named in the Defendant’s adoption petition (who was not a party) could not have been a minor at the material time and, accordingly, could not have been lawfully adopted under English law.

Arfan Khan was instructed on behalf of the Claimant by C V Brooks Solicitors

Court of Appeal delivers a Landmark Ruling on Fairness and Statutory Consultations in Judicial Appointments

Court of Appeal decision, Judicial Appointments Commission, Thomas v Judicial Appointments Commission, , ,

R (Thomas) v Judicial Appointments Commission (4A Law Ltd intervening) [2025] EWCA Civ 912

Introduction

In R (Thomas) v Judicial Appointments Commission (4A Law Ltd intervening) [2025] EWCA Civ 912, the Court of Appeal provided landmark guidance on the statutory scheme and rules of fairness governing the appointment of judges in England and Wales.

The Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Underhill, and Lady Justice Nicola Davies) applied key principles of procedural fairness. It clarified the application and scope of the disclosure obligations of the Judicial Appointments Commissions (the JAC) under section 139 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (the CRA 2005).

Arfan Khan, leading Tahir Ashraf, represented 4A Law Ltd, in an unprecedented oral and written public interest intervention, permitted by the Court at both the permission to intervene stage and at the oral hearing.

Given that the case proceeded by way of judicial review rather than an appeal, the Court did not broadcast the oral hearing, in contrast to the earlier permission to appeal hearing, where limited permission was granted.

The public can access the reported coverage, including the 4A Law Ltd press release, which describes Arfan Khan’s work as “immensely exceptional”, through the following links:

https://4alaw.com/court-of-appeal-says-no-to-secret-soundings-in-judicial-appointments/

https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/judicial-appointments-commission-rejects-secret-soundings-by-back-door-claim/5123812.article

Background

This case marked the first occasion on which the Court of Appeal scrutinised the legality of the JAC’s long-standing practice of obtaining confidential third-party feedback—commonly referred to as “sub-consultations”—in the course of judicial selection.

The Claimant, a salaried District Judge, applied for appointment as a Circuit Judge in both the criminal and civil jurisdictions during the JAC’s 2021/2022 selection exercise. Having attended a structured interview on selection day, which included questions on her approach to COVID-19 precautions, she was graded “C” (selectable) in both jurisdictions. That outcome reflected mixed statutory consultation feedback, but was ultimately endorsed by the assigned commissioner of the JAC’s Selection and Character Committee (SCC), who, alongside the panel, considered her performance sufficient for appointment.

However, the SCC later reversed this recommendation. The assigned commissioner altered her view upon a second reading of the materials, concluding that certain adverse statutory consultation comments resonated with concerns expressed by the interview panel. The Claimant was accordingly downgraded to “D” (not presently selectable). Crucially, the negative statutory feedback was not disclosed to her.

The Claimant suspected that the feedback may have come from a senior judge against whom she had previously lodged a bullying complaint, and whom she believed was consulted through the JAC’s undisclosed sub-consultation process.

Following the decision, the Claimant received two conflicting feedback letters. On 6 May 2022, she was informed that she was “selectable” but had not been appointed due to competition. Yet, on 24 May 2022, a second letter stated she was “not presently selectable”, citing insufficient evidence of competency in the criterion “Working and Communicating with Others” — a criterion the panel had previously found she satisfied.

Upon seeking clarification, the JAC acknowledged that the SCC had disagreed with the interview panel’s assessment and had downgraded her grading from “selectable” to “not presently selectable” accordingly. Despite further requests for disclosure, no substantive explanation or documents were forthcoming. As a result, the Claimant issued judicial review proceedings in July 2022.

Although the High Court initially refused permission, the Court of Appeal subsequently granted limited permission in June 2024 and retained the case for determination in the Court of Appeal.

The Legal Framework

The Court considered three legal provisions:

1. Section 139, Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA 2005) – governs the confidentiality of candidate information and its lawful disclosure.

2. Section 88, CRA 2005 – requires the JAC to determine the selection process.

3. Regulation 30, Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013 – provides for statutory consultation by a specified consultee (Regulation 30).

Procedural Fairness

The Court reaffirmed that the principles of procedural fairness, as set out by Lord Mustill in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, apply to the exercise of statutory powers such as those exercised by the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) (J [46]-[47]). In Doody, it was held that fairness requires an individual to know the gist of the case he has to answer and that fairness is inherently flexible and must be assessed contextually. The Court held that the JAC could not lawfully adopt a rigid policy permitting disclosure only in exceptional circumstances (J 72-73). Such an approach constituted an impermissible fetter on its discretion (J [73], [86], [88] (ii)).

The Court also applied the reasoning of Singh LJ in R (Talpada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841, affirming the well-established principles that procedural fairness, grounded in the principles of natural justice (bias or the opportunity to be heard), serves to prevent legal error in public decision-making. The Court held that the JAC ought, in fairness, to inform candidates in advance that comments will be sought about them from the Consultee and sub-consultees (J [19] (vi) and J [87]).

It held that candidates must be informed in general terms of how sub-consultations work and the categories of individuals who may be sub-consulted; it is insufficient to provide an online link (J [82]). The JAC, the Court emphasised, is under a duty to act fairly when using negative material [J [79].

Substantive fairness and abuse of power 

The Court, citing Singh LJ in Talpada, affirmed the doctrine of substantive fairness, which is important in ensuring that a public authority acts lawfully and, in particular, does not abuse the powers which have been entrusted to it by Parliament (J [84]). However, the Court held (applying the reasoning in Talpada) that the doctrine of substantive fairness does not grant courts broad discretion to overturn executive decisions that are non-justiciable.

Under this doctrine, only substantive unfairness that amounts to an abuse of power is justiciable, and the court’s role is principally to “correct errors of law made by public authorities and ensure that fair procedures have been complied with” (J [81] referring to Talpada). This is intended to ensure the separation of powers so that the Courts do not encroach on executive decisions which are non-justiciable. This legal certainty—ensuring predictable rules—is essential to the rule of law, just as much as correcting abuse of power (J [85] referring to Talpada).

The Court found no basis for concluding that the decision of the JAC not to appoint could be quashed on substantive fairness grounds following the reasoning in Talpada. Whilst the unfair failure to inform candidates in advance about the sub-consultation process was wrong, this was not an extreme case in which the Court should intervene to exceptionally quash the decision on substantive fairness grounds (J [85]).

Regulation 30

The Court held that, although Regulation 30 refers to a single statutory consultee, it does not forbid that consultee from seeking input from others (J [19] (i)-(ii) J [55] and J [57). Therefore, the JAC’s use of sub-consultees was not inherently unlawful.

However, the Court found the JAC’s rigid policy of non-disclosure—only allowing disclosure in “exceptional” cases — to be an unlawful fetter on its discretion. The JAC’s failure to inform candidates that wider third-party consultations might occur was also unfair, as candidates are entitled to know in advance who may provide information.

The Master of the Rolls held that there was serious doubt about whether the consultation contemplated by regulation 30 is the kind of statutory consultation undertaken by the JAC. It does not, however, matter because the kind of consultation and sub-consultation undertaken by the JAC is lawful under section 88 (1) (J 19 (i), J [55]-[56]). The Master of the Rolls held that the JAC has consistently used sub-consultations to solicit feedback on candidate competencies rather than on the demands of the office.

The decision of Lord Justice Underhill on Regulation 30

Lord Justice Underhill rejected the JAC’s reliance on Regulation 30 to justify its practice of obtaining third-party feedback on judicial candidates (J [91]-[95]). Although described as a provision for “Consultation,” the regulation, on its proper construction, authorises only direct consultation with a single individual—namely, the Lord Chief Justice or a person with “relevant experience” of the office in question (J [91]-[92]).

His Lordship held that the phrase “relevant experience” is best understood as experience comparable to holding the judicial office itself (J [92). But even if “relevant experience” could be stretched to encompass experience of the qualities of the candidates (as suggested by the Master of the Rolls), that still does not help because, as the Master of the Rolls points out, the SPJ or their deputy will have no personal knowledge of many or most of the candidates which the Deputy Senior Presiding Judge (DSPJ) does not ordinarily possess: (J [92]). In practice, consultees such as the DSPJ operate as intermediaries, soliciting views from others—something Regulation 30 does not permit (J [92]).

However, his Lordship agreed that, on the available materials, section 88 supplied an alternative basis that did not affect his Lordship’s agreement with the Master of the Rolls on the lawfulness of such exercises based on the rules of fairness, though Regulation 30 was in equivalent form.

Consequences of the above guidance

The Court granted the judge the following landmark declarations:

1.  The Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) must not unlawfully restrict its discretion by limiting disclosure of such information, or its gist, to only “exceptional circumstances.”

2. To ensure a fair selection process under section 88 of the Act, the JAC is required to inform candidates in advance of the categories of individuals from whom it may seek views or information during the selection process. Transparency and fairness are essential to lawful decision-making.

Section 139 of the CRA 2005

The Court of Appeal held that section 139 (5) of the CRA 2005 does not impose an absolute bar on the disclosure of adverse comments received during the judicial appointments process. The Court held that consent from the information source is not required where disclosure is “necessary” for the JAC to fulfil its statutory functions under section 139 (4) (b) (J [19 (iii)). Section 139 (5) is not a standalone requirement overriding the broader statutory framework.

The Court identified five lawful responses available to the JAC when handling negative material: (1) ignore it, (2) test it indirectly at interview (i.e. subject to the requirements of fairness – emphasis added in brackets), (3) disclose a summary or gist, (4) seek the informant’s consent for full disclosure, and (5) disclose without consent, if necessary, under section 139 (4) (J [71]). The JAC’s refusal to consider all options was held to be unlawful.

Lord Justice Underhill’s decision on s.139

Lord Justice Underhill provided guidance on the construction of section 139 (J [96]-[100]): subsection (1) establishes the general rule of confidentiality; subsections (2)–(3) define its scope; subsection (4) lists exceptions based on lawful authority. If one of these exceptions applies, disclosure is permitted. These exceptions are alternative and include disclosure necessary for judicial functions, disciplinary actions, or legal proceedings, regardless of consent, and disclosure with consent.

However, because subsection (5) refers back through subsection (3) to the definition of “confidential information” and ultimately to subsection (1), it remains subject to the lawful exceptions in subsection (4). Thus, subsection (5) does not override the lawful exceptions but qualifies how confidentiality is managed, particularly protecting sources from identification unless disclosure is necessary under one of the lawful authority grounds.

Lady Justice Nicola Davies agreed with both judgments, preferring the conclusions of the Master of the Rolls on Regulation 30.

Consequences of the above guidance

The Court proceeded to grant the following landmark declaration:

1. Section 139(5) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does not bar the disclosure of information provided by one identifiable individual about another, where section 139 (4) applies.

Party representation

Ben Collins KC and Nicola Newbegin (instructed by RRM Law Limited) for the judge

Sir James Eadie KC, Robert Moretto and Natasha Simonsen (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Defendant/Respondent (the JAC)

Arfan Khan and Tahir Ashraf (instructed by 4A Law Limited) for the Intervener (the Intervener)

The judgment can be accessed through the following link:

Katie Thomas, R (on the application of) v Judicial Appointments Commission – Find Case Law – The National Archives

 

Court of Appeal hears landmark judicial review in Thomas v the Judicial Appointments Commission

Court of Appeal Judicial Review,

Court of Appeal hears landmark judicial review in Court of Appeal hears landmark judicial review in Thomas v the Judicial Appointments Commission

Arfan Khan, leading Tahir Ashraf, appeared on behalf of the intervenor, 4A Law Ltd, in a landmark two-day judicial review heard in the Court of Appeal by the Master of the Rolls, Sir Geoffrey Vos, Lord Justice Underhill, Vice President of the Court of Appeal Civil Division, and Lady Justice Nicola Davies (“the Court of Appeal”).

The judicial review concerns a claim brought by District Judge Kate Thomas challenging a decision of the Judicial Appointments Commission not to recommend her for appointment as a Circuit Judge, following receipt of undisclosed adverse material.

With permission from the Court of Appeal, Arfan Khan made both oral and written submissions addressing fundamental questions about the fairness of the judicial appointments process involving statutory consultations.

Arfan Khan is instructed in the public interest by 4A Law Ltd, who have also instructed him to lead in other landmark public law interventions in the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme Court, such as  Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] HRLR 15; [2016] QB 347, and Reyes v Al-Malki [2016] 1 WLR 1785.

The Claimant, District Judge Kate Thomas, is represented by Ben Collins KC and Nicola Newbegin, instructed by RRM Law Ltd.

The Defendant, the Judicial Appointments Commission, is represented by Sir James Eadie KC, Robert Mareto, and Natasha Simonsen, instructed by the Government Legal Department.

 

 

High Court Judicial Review of Local Authority’s Age Assessment

Local Authority Age Assessment, , , ,

High Court Judicial Review of Local Authority’s Age Assessment

Arfan Khan represented a government local authority in High Court proceedings involving an application for permission to participate in a judicial review (JR), relief from sanctions, and the substantive JR.

The local authority had assessed the applicant as an adult, based on his refusal to provide a clear copy of his Sudanese ID, the assessment of a social worker, and a Home Office decision. Following an interview with the applicant, the social worker and the Home Office immigration officials found that the applicant was a 23 year old adult, based on his appearance, demeanour, and credibility.

The applicant was granted limited permission to proceed with the JR but was denied interim relief. A notice to rely on the summary grounds of defence as detailed grounds was inadvertently overlooked by the local authority. The applicant argued that this failure barred the local authority from participating in the JR proceedings. The local authority accepted that the failure to file the notice was an oversight. It applied for permission to participate in the JR and relief from sanctions.

The High Court (Suise Alegre, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) granted the local authority permission to participate and relief from sanctions, finding that the failure to file the notice on time was due to an oversight. It concluded that no prejudice had been caused to the applicant, as the pleaded defence remained unchanged for the final hearing. The JR, moreover, involved significant public policy considerations that could not be adequately addressed by submissions from the applicant alone.

Jonathan Moffett KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, subsequently allowed the JR for the reasons set out in his judgment. The local authority, consequently, agreed to make a fresh decision following a further interview with the applicant.

The judgment can be viewed here:

The King (On the Application of Abaj) v West Sussex County Council

High Court delivers judgment in solar park case

High Court Solar Park, ,

High Court delivers judgment in solar park case

Mr Justice Constable delivered judgment in a solar park dispute, dismissing claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and restitution.

Arfan Khan appeared for the Claimants at short notice. The Claimant’s earlier pleadings had been prepared by leading and junior counsel from different leading commercial chambers in London.

The judge refused permission to appeal his decision and reduced the Defendant’s recoverable costs. In addition, the judge ordered the Defendant to pay the costs arising from their Amended Defence, which was ultimately found immaterial.

The Claimants’ solicitors, acting on the client’s instructions, agreed to the Amended Defence in open correspondence, without waiver of the Claimant’s right to file an Amended Reply as expressly permitted by the Defendant’s draft order. The correspondence confirming the agreement to the Amended Defence was referred to during the Claimants’ oral submissions, without waiver of the right to file an Amended Reply. This right was exercised during closing arguments, after the Defendant concluded its case based on the amended defence, at which point a response became relevant. Until that point, the amendments were not relevant for a response.

For practical reasons, there is no further appeal against the judgments and, therefore, the correctness of the judge’s reasons will be untested at appellate level in this case.

The judge’s reasons can be accessed through the following links:

Assensus Ltd v Wirsol Energy Ltd (Re Consequential Matters) [2025] EWHC 503 (KB) (07 March 2025)

Assensus Ltd v Wirsol Energy Ltd [2025] EWHC 410 (KB) (26 February 2025)

Arfan Khan leads the 4A Law Ltd intervention in the Court of Appeal in R (on the Application of) Thomas v Judicial Appointments Commission [2024] EWCA Civ 665

Guidance from the Court of Appeal, Judicial Appointments Commission, Public Interest Intervention, Statutory Consultations and disclosure

Arfan Khan leads junior counsel Tahir Ashraf instructed by 4A Law Ltd (4A Law) in the above public interest intervention against the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) to be heard in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division).

A landmark judicial review challenge by District Judge Katie Thomas is the subject of this appeal against the JAC for its refusal to appoint her as a Circuit Judge.

Lord Justice Underhill granted 4A Law permission to intervene in writing and permitted attendance at the hearing to make necessary oral submissions, whilst admitting the evidence (to the extent it may be relied upon at the oral hearing).

The intervention seeks guidance from the Court of Appeal on the circumstances in which the JAC should disclose adverse statutory consultations to judicial applicants. It argues for the true legal interpretation of the statutory scheme governing such disclosure in light of the contextual evidence.

The intervention was opposed by Sir James Eady KC and Robert Moreto instructed by the Government Legal Department.

Arfan Khan has led in other landmark public international law cases instructed by 4A Law such as Benkharbouche v Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] H.R.L.R. 15; [2016] QB 347 (both in the Court of Appeal and in the UKSC) and Reyes v Al-Malaki [2016] 1 WLR 1785 (Court of Appeal and in the UKSC in writing).

 

HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION) ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE CLAIMANTS FOR OVER £22.7 MILLION

Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Chancery Division, Commercial and Chancery litigation, Judgment millions

HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION) ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE CLAIMANTS FOR OVER £22.7 MILLION

Arfan Khan represented the successful Claimants in Gangat v Jassat throughout the litigation instructed by Pandya Arbitration Global.  

The Claimants, former part-owners of the Jumbo Group in South Africa, through third parties transferred substantial funds in millions to Swiss accounts in the 1980s and 1990s allegedly in breach of the South African Exchange Control Regulations to avoid the consequences of the Apartheid. Later, when the Apartheid was over, they regularised their financial affairs with the South African Revenue Service. 

The Defendant, a British national, took control of these funds and made investments on the Claimants’ behalf, amassing a significant portfolio of cash and property. Despite holding these assets, the Defendant refused to return them. After over seven years of litigation, the High Court ruled in favour of the Claimants, ordering an account for breach of fiduciary duty. 

The Defendant’s appeal against the decision ordering an account was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Nugee, Lord Justice Stuart Smith, and Lord Justice Warby) on all grounds.  

Thereafter, the High Court awarded the Claimants an interim payment in the $millions and recently entered judgment for the Claimants for over £22.7 million including costs.  

 The reported judgments can be accessed through the following links:

Gangat v Jassat (2022) EWCA 604 (Court of Appeal)
Gangat v Jassat (2021) EWHC 2644 (Ch)

The recent order entering judgment has not been made publicly available.

 

Arfan Khan undertakes Judicial Work Shadowing with a judge in the Chancery Division of the High Court with authorisation from the senior judiciary

Judicial sitting, ,

On invitation of the senior judiciary of England and Wales through the Judicial Office at the time, Arfan Khan has undertaken work experience with a judge in the High Court Chancery Division through judicial work shadowing, sometimes informally known as “sitting in“. He sat with the judge in a complex tax matter arising from the Royal Mail Group Litigation, and in the urgent business and interim applications list dealing with interlocutory injunctions. This took place outside the formal judicial mentoring schemes that now operate.

Arfan Khan is grateful for this opportunity, which provides him with exceptional judicial sitting experience, and is grateful to all those who supported him.