Tag Archives: High Court

High Court Judicial Review of Local Authority’s Age Assessment

Local Authority Age Assessment, , , ,

High Court Judicial Review of Local Authority’s Age Assessment

Arfan Khan represented a government local authority in High Court proceedings involving an application for permission to participate in a judicial review (JR), relief from sanctions, and the substantive JR.

The local authority had assessed the applicant as an adult, based on his refusal to provide a clear copy of his Sudanese ID, the assessment of a social worker, and a Home Office decision. Following an interview with the applicant, the social worker and the Home Office immigration officials found that the applicant was a 23 year old adult, based on his appearance, demeanour, and credibility.

The applicant was granted limited permission to proceed with the JR but was denied interim relief. A notice to rely on the summary grounds of defence as detailed grounds was inadvertently overlooked by the local authority. The applicant argued that this failure barred the local authority from participating in the JR proceedings. The local authority accepted that the failure to file the notice was an oversight. It applied for permission to participate in the JR and relief from sanctions.

The High Court (Suise Alegre, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) granted the local authority permission to participate and relief from sanctions, finding that the failure to file the notice on time was due to an oversight. It concluded that no prejudice had been caused to the applicant, as the pleaded defence remained unchanged for the final hearing. The JR, moreover, involved significant public policy considerations that could not be adequately addressed by submissions from the applicant alone.

Jonathan Moffett KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, subsequently allowed the JR for the reasons set out in his judgment. The local authority, consequently, agreed to make a fresh decision following a further interview with the applicant.

The judgment can be viewed here:

The King (On the Application of Abaj) v West Sussex County Council

HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION) ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE CLAIMANTS FOR OVER £22.7 MILLION

Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Chancery Division, Commercial and Chancery litigation, Judgment millions

HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION) ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE CLAIMANTS FOR OVER £22.7 MILLION

Arfan Khan represented the successful Claimants in Gangat v Jassat throughout the litigation instructed by Pandya Arbitration Global.  

The Claimants, former part-owners of the Jumbo Group in South Africa, through third parties transferred substantial funds in millions to Swiss accounts in the 1980s and 1990s allegedly in breach of the South African Exchange Control Regulations to avoid the consequences of the Apartheid. Later, when the Apartheid was over, they regularised their financial affairs with the South African Revenue Service. 

The Defendant, a British national, took control of these funds and made investments on the Claimants’ behalf, amassing a significant portfolio of cash and property. Despite holding these assets, the Defendant refused to return them. After over seven years of litigation, the High Court ruled in favour of the Claimants, ordering an account for breach of fiduciary duty. 

The Defendant’s appeal against the decision ordering an account was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Nugee, Lord Justice Stuart Smith, and Lord Justice Warby) on all grounds.  

Thereafter, the High Court awarded the Claimants an interim payment in the $millions and recently entered judgment for the Claimants for over £22.7 million including costs.  

 The reported judgments can be accessed through the following links:

Gangat v Jassat (2022) EWCA 604 (Court of Appeal)
Gangat v Jassat (2021) EWHC 2644 (Ch)

The recent order entering judgment has not been made publicly available.

 

Chancery Division rules on the test for setting aside summary judgment and copyright infringement

Appeal, Chancery Division, copyright infringement, copyright infringement, High Court, Phonographic Performance, Phonographic Performance Judgment, summary judgment set aside test, Uncategorized, , , , , , ,
Phonographic Performance Ltd v Ambibola Balgun t/a Mama Africa [2018] EWHC 1327 (Ch)
Copyright infringement – Summary Judgment set aside test

The Claimant claimed that the Defendant had played sound recordings, which infringed copyright in relation to two songs, contrary to s.16 of the Copyright & Patents Act 1988 (“the CPDA”). The Claimant obtained summary judgment on its claim in the absence of the Defendant who was acting as a litigant in person. Following enforcement, the Defendant applied to set aside summary judgment. The Master refused to set it aside using CPR 39.3 (5) as a guide.

The Defendant appealed contending that

1. The Master’s approach to the principles applicable to setting aside an order for summary judgment obtained in the absence of a party was wrong, in that he had applied the test for setting aside judgment after a trial, which was not the right approach. The defence had real prospects of success because the defendant had authorised the playing of music in the restaurant, but he had not authorised the infringement of copyright.

2. He had no control over whether independent DJ’s played music infringing the copyright;

3. There were other reasons why this matter ought to go to trial, including the fact that it was inappropriate to conduct a mini trial at the summary judgment. (§ para 9 of the Judgment).

Miss Penelope Reed QC sitting as a Judge of the High Court Chancery Division held:

1. There was some force in the first argument, and it ought to be easier to set aside summary judgment orders in appropriate circumstances (§ para 13).

2. The Court should take into account other rules of the CPR which provide that judgments can be set aside such as judgments in default under CPR r 13 (§ para 14).

3. It was not inappropriate to take into account considerations set out in CPR r 39.3 (5). However, the Judge held that those considerations ought not to be too rigidly applied in circumstances where there has been no trial (§ para 14). There may be other relevant considerations, including whether there are other reasons why the matter ought to be tried (§ para 15).

4. The Master had used CPR r 39.3 (5) as a guide. Whilst another Judge may have taken a different view on the issue of whether the Appellant acted promptly, the Master could not be criticised for finding that the application had been made late. The Master had not erred (§ para 18).It is the authorisation of the playing of music in public which is relevant within the meaning of s.16 of the CPD 1988, and not the authorisation of specific songs which infringe copyright (§ para 28).

5. Amstrad could be distinguished on the basis that there was no control over use to which their equipment was put, whereas the Appellant had complete control over the playing of music in his premises (§ para 28).

6. DJ’s did not exceed the nature of the authority conferred upon them. Therefore, the Master’s decision was not at odds with the law of agency (§ 29).

7. There were no real prospect of success at trial and permission ought to be refused (§ para 30).

The Judgment can be accessed here:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2018/1327.html

Judgment: Phonographic Performance Ltd

Arfan Khan argued the case on behalf of the Defendant, instructed by DCK Solicitors. He did not appear below.

State Immunity
Court of Appeal